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Elliptic curves (EC) are widely studied due to their mathematical
and cryptographic properties. Cryptographers have used the proper-
ties of EC to construct elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC). ECC are
based on the assumption of hardness of special instances of the discrete
logarithm problem in EC. One of the strong merits of ECC is providing
the same cryptographic strength with smaller key size compared to
other public key cryptosystems. A 256 bit ECC can provide similar
cryptographic strength as 3072 bit RSA cryptosystem. Due to smaller
key sizes, elliptic curves are an attractive option in devices with limited
storage capacity. It is therefore essential to understand how to generate
these curves, verify their correctness and assure that they are resistant
against attacks.
The security of an EC cryptosystem is determined by the choice of the
curve that is used in that cryptosystem. Over the years, a number of el-
liptic curves were introduced for cryptographic use. Elliptic curves such
as FRP256V1, NIST P-256, Secp256k1 or SM2 curve are widely used
in many applications like cryptocurrencies, transport layer protocol
and Internet messaging applications. Another type of popular curves
are Curve25519 introduced by Dan Bernstein and Curve448 introduced
by Mike Hamburg, which are used in an end to end encryption protocol
called Signal. This protocol is used in popular messaging applications
like WhatsApp, Signal Messenger and Facebook Messenger.
Recently, there has been a growing distrust among security researchers
against the previously standardized curves. We have seen backdoors in
the elliptic curve cryptosystems like the DUAL EC DRBG function that
was standardized by NIST, and suspicious “random seeds” that were
used in NIST P-curves. We can say that many of the previously stan-
dardized curves lack transparency in their generation and verification.
In this thesis, we focus on transparent generation and verification of
elliptic curves. We generate curves based on NIST standards and
iii
propose new standards to generate special type of elliptic curves. We
test their resistance against the known attacks that target the ECC.
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Part I
Elliptic curves theory and
algorithms
1 Introduction and thesis overview
Elliptic curves are defined by certain cubic equations with two variables. The
simplified Weierstrass equation is often used for cryptography purpose. It is
defined as,
y2 = x3 + ax+ b,
where a, b are real numbers and x and y take on the values in the real numbers.
EC that are defined over finite fields are of stronger importance in cryptogra-
phy. Typically the curves used for cryptographic purpose are defined over a
large prime field Fp or Galois field GF (2n), of around 2250 elements. A wide
range of standardized elliptic curves are deployed over the Internet. Standards
like ANSSI, NIST, OSCCA, Brainpool set out a list of requirements that the
curves should satisfy in order to be a standardized curve. Recently there has
been some concerns about the security of the previously standardized curves.
Curves like FRP256V1 standardized by ANSSI and SM2 curve standardized
by OSCCA are distributed without any public justification. That is, their
parameters were chosen without any explanation for how they were chosen
[4]. This should raise suspicions about any potential backdoors that could be
present in these curves.
The Snowden leak in 2013 showed that NSA deliberately inserted a backdoor
in a CSPRNG function called DUAL EC DRBG used in many ECC. NIST stan-
dardized the dual elliptic curve deterministic random bit generator function
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despite security researchers deeming it to be insecure [21].
This increased a level of distrust among cryptographers for previously stan-
dardized curves. Bernstein et al. demonstrate the generation of vulnerable
curves that follow all the standardization requirements. One could assume
that the standardization agencies distribute curves that can lead the users to
believe the curves are secure but the agencies are able to break them [4].
It is therefore essential to understand the criteria for generating the curves
and verifying the parameters of an EC. The security of an ECC is based
on the assumption of hardness of special instances of the discrete logarithm
problem in EC. This hardness depends primarily on the parameters of an EC
and the choice of the starting point. Flori et al. discuss the necessary criteria
that a curve must satisfy in order to be deemed secure [11]. We cover these
criteria in more detail in the thesis.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the generation and verification process
of EC. We develop software that generates curve parameters adhering to all
the necessary requirements. Finally, we test the security of the generated
curves using a tool developed by Dan Bernstein and Tanja Lange. The end
goal is to generate curves that can be used as alternative curves in well known
end to end encryption protocols like Signal.
1.1 Thesis overview
There has been growing distrust for previously standardized curves due their
weaknesses or unexplained generation processes. With the ever increasing
usage of end-to-end encrypted protocols, it is essential that the cryptographic
primitives used in these protocols are publicly trusted. Dan Bernstein and
his colleagues paved the way for programmers to move from insecure stan-
dardized elliptic curves to new family of secure and trusted elliptic curves [5].
Curve25519 along with its implementation in Signal protocol popularized the
end-to-end encryption methodology. In this thesis, we study the properties of
elliptic curve that are used or could be used in Signal protocol. We study
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elliptic curve structure and analyze its security. We focus on the criteria that
the curves have to satisfy in order to be “safe”. We analyze security criteria
recommended by various cryptographers. Using the SafeCurves criteria,
we propose Montgomery elliptic curves that are secure to use in protocols
such as Signal. Finally we present the security analysis of our curves and
demonstrate their usage in small elliptic curve cryptosystem.
1.2 Thesis goals
G1: Overview the use of EC in cryptosystems. To generate an elliptic curve,
it is important to understand the underlying concepts of elliptic curves
and its group operations.
G2: Analyze security of EC. We focus on requirements that make EC secure.
G3: Construct software to generate secure EC.
G4: Verify the correctness of generated curves with respect to the guidelines.
Adhering to the requirements, we generate curve parameters and check
if the curve passes all the necessary requirements.
G5: Test the usability of the generated curve in ECC. Once the gener-
ated curve passes all the necessary requirements, we will construct toy
cryptosystem using the generated curve.
G6: The curves we generate should be resistant against the known ECDLP
attacks. However, we will demonstrate ECDLP attacks on small EC.
1.3 Outcomes
G1: We studied the use of EC in different cryptosystems. We observed
the different families of EC and their properties and features. These
features helped us understand why specific curves are chosen in certain
cryptosystems.
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G2: We analyzed the security of EC by studying the different types of attacks
that can affect the security of ECC.
G3: We constructed a software that would perform the EC arithmetic and
EC conversions on three different families of curves. We use GMP library
to efficiently and accurately compute ECC arithmetic operations.
G4: We verified the security of generated curves with respect to the SafeCurves
criteria. We generated the curve parameters that passed all the necessary
security requirements.
G5: We constructed a toy EC Cryptosystem that is based on the generated
the curves that we have generated. We demonstrate the use of our curve
in different elliptic curve cryptosystems.
G6: We implemented algorithms to solve ECDL problem on small EC. We
verified that the resistance of our generated curves against modern
ECDLP solvers.
2 Elliptic curves
Elliptic curves are the basis of elliptic curve cryptosystems. Elliptic curves
are defined by certain cubic equations with two variables. These curves can
be defined over real number, modulo a prime number, or over a finite field Fp.
For cryptographic use, we focus on elliptic curves that are defined over finite
fields Fp.
Definition 1 Consider a finite field Fp. Let a, b ∈ Fp be constants such that
4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. A nonsingular elliptic curve is the set E of solutions (x, y) ∈
F2p to the equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b,
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together with a special point O called the point at infinity. This equation is
called a Weierstrass equation. We will cover other type of equations in later
sections.
Figure 1: Plot of y2 = x3 + x+ 28 over Z71
2.1 Group operations on elliptic curves
Group operations such as addition and scalar multiplication are performed
using the points on the curve. There are two cases of group operations that
we consider: Addition of two distinct points on the curve and addition of a
point on the curve with itself (point doubling).
2.1.1 Point addition
Point addition requires “adding” two distinct points on the elliptic curve to
produce a third point. Since we are producing a third point by “adding” two
points, the operation is arbitrarily named as “addition” [19].
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Consider two points P,Q ∈ E where P (x1, y1) and Q(x2, y2), we define group
operation addition as P (x1, y1) + Q(x2, y2) = R(x3, y3). The algebraic for-
mula to compute R is as follows:
Case 1: x1 6= x2
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2,





Case 2: x1 = x2, y1 = −y2
(x1, y1) + (x1,−y1) = O.
Case 3: x1 = x2 and y1 = y2
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2,





2.1.2 Point scalar multiplication
Point scalar multiplication is an operation where a point P is added to itself
k number of times, where 3 ≤ k ≤ n and n is the order of the base point of
curve E. Point multiplication operation on EC corresponds to exponentiation
[19]. It is the basis of elliptic curve discrete log problem (ECDLP).
P + P + P + P + ........+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
= kP.
There are various methods to efficiently compute point multiplication. Such as
double and add algorithm, Montgomery ladder and sliding window approach.
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2.2 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is an analog of the discrete
log problem (DLP). Consider a base point P and another point Q such that
P,Q ∈ E, the problem asks to find integer d, where 1 ≤ d ≤ #E, such that
P = dQ. Here, the total number of points on E is denoted by #E.
Security of ECC is determined by the hardness of ECDLP problem. Size of
the curve and properly chosen base point can make the ECDLP problem hard.
For an EC to be secure, computing the value of d should be an infeasible
task.
2.3 Elliptic curves in cryptography
Elliptic curves are widely used in the modern cryptography due to their
properties. Unlike RSA, the EC key size d is smaller but it provides the same
level of security. This makes the usage of EC very compelling in computers
that have limited storage and computational capacity. For this reason, EC is
used for digital signature algorithms, key exchange algorithms, key agreement
algorithms and pseudo-random generators. EC is a fundamental building
block in end-to-end encryption protocol Signal and for cyrptocurrencies like
Bitcoin and Ethereum.
2.3.1 Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)
Diffie Hellman key exchange (DHKE) protocol is used to securely exchange
keys between two parties over an insecure channel. Elliptic curve Diffie Hell-
man (ECDH) is a variation of DHKE which uses EC. DHKE uses modular
arithmetic to compute the keys whereas ECDH uses elliptic curve arithmetic.
Before initiating the ECDH protocol, both parties have to agree upon an
elliptic curve and its primitives such as base point. Once the primitives are
agreed upon, the protocol works as follows:
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Alice Bob
choose kprA = a ∈ {2, 3, ...,#E − 1} choose kprB = b ∈ {2, 3, ...,#E − 1}
compute kpubA = aP = A = (xA, yA) compute kpubB = bP = B = (xB, yB)
A−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
B←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
compute aB = TAB compute bA = TAB
Shared secret between Alice and Bob is TAB = (xAB, yAB)
2.3.2 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Digital Signal Algorithm(DSA) is used to sign and verify messages. The
messages are signed using the private key of the signer and verified using the
public key of the signer. DSA key generation operations are defined under
Z∗p . Unlike DSA, ECDSA is defined under a group of an elliptic curve.
• Key Generation of ECDSA:
– Choose a large prime p and an elliptic curve E defined over Zp
– Choose a point A on E such that it generates a cyclic group of
prime order n.
– Let P = {0, 1},A = Z∗p ×Z∗p, and define K = f(p, n, E,A,m,B) :
B = mA where 0 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
– Public key is (p, n, E,A,B), and m is the private key
• Signature generation:
– Choose a random ephemeral key k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
– sigK(x, k) = (r, s) where,
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∗ kA = (u, v)
∗ r = u mod n
∗ s = k−1(SHA512(x) +mr) mod n
• Signature verification:
– Compute w = s−1 mod n
– i = w× SHA512(x) mod n
– j = wr mod n
– (u, v) = iA + jB
– verK(x, (r, s)) = true⇔ u mod n = r
2.3.3 Signal protocol
Signal protocol uses extended triple Diffie Hellman (X3DH) key agreement
protocol to establish a shared secret key between the two communicating
parties. And it uses extended Edwards curve digital signature algorithm
(XEdDSA) for verification of messages and public keys used in communi-
cation. Here, we focus on X3DH as it uses XEdDSA in one of its steps to
establish shared secret key. X3DH provides forward secrecy and cryptographic
deniability. We focus on asynchronous communication scenario between two
parties “Alice” and “Bob” , where Bob is offline and Alice wants to send a
message to Bob.
Before setting up X3DH protocol in an application, We must decide upon
following parameters.
Name Definition
curve Curve25519 or Curve448
hash A 256 or 512-bit hash function (e.g. SHA-256 or SHA-512)
info Information about the protocol (e.g My Application)
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Cryptographic Notations:
• X||Y : Concatenation of byte sequences X and Y .
• DH(PK1, PK2) : Shared secret obtained from Elliptic Curve Diffie
Hellman function using public keys PK1 and PK2.
• Sig(PK,M) : Byte signature generated by XEdDSA function with M
as message and PK as public key.
• KDF (KM) : Key Derivation function that derives a secret key that is
used to encrypt the message.
Keys:
• IKA - Alice’s Identity Key.
• EKA - Alice’s Ephemeral Key.
• IKB - Bob’s Identity Key.
• EKB - Bob’s Ephemeral Key.
• SPKB - Bob’s signed prekey.
• OPKB - Bob’s one time prekey.
The keys used in X3DH are elliptic curve public keys. All of the keys have
their corresponding private keys. Identity keys are long term keys. Ephemeral
keys are generated on every iteration of the protocol. Prekeys are uploaded
to the server before initiation of any communication. Each party signs their
prekeys and uploads it to the server. Prekeys ensure forward secrecy.
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Sending initial message:
Each communicating party publishes their identity keys (IK), signed prekeys
(SPK), prekey signatures Sig(IK,Encode(SPK)) and a bunch of one time
prekeys (OPK1,OPK3,OPK3,...). Identity keys are uploaded once while
signed prekeys and its signatures are uploaded in intervals (e.g every week or
every month).
To perform the X3DH Key Agreement, Alice has to fetch a set of keys of Bob
from server. These keys are :
• Identity key of Bob IKB
• Signed prekey of Bob SPKB
• Prekey signature of Identity key and signed private key
Sig(IKB, Encode(SPKB))
• Optional Bob’s one time prekey OPKB
The one time prekey is optional. If it exists then the server should fetch it to
Alice and then delete it. Alice generates her own set of ephemeral keys EKA
Alice then generates a shared secret key that is used to encrypt messages
between her and Bob. This shared secret key is calculated by performing
three or four Diffie Hellman Key exchanges depending upon the presence of
Bob’s one time prekey.
DH1 = DH(IKA, SPKB)
DH2 = DH(EKA, IKB)
DH3 = DH(EKA, SPKB)
If OPKB exists,
DH4 = DH(EKA, OPKB)
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The above Diffie Hellman exchanges provide two properties-
• DH1 and DH2 : Mutual Authentication
• DH3 and DH4 : Forward Secrecy
Secret Key is calculated after all the exchanges are performed.
SK = KDF (DH1||DH2||DH3||DH4)
This secret key is used for encrypting the messages between Alice and Bob.
2.4 Domain parameters
Generator of the curve:
The generator G of the curve is a special point on the curve that can generate
the entire group when repeatedly added to itself. It is also referred as the
base point.
Order of the curve:
The order of the curve #E is the total number of points on the EC.
Order of the base point:
The order of base point G is the smallest positive integer n such that nG = O.
Cofactor of the curve:
The cofactor h denotes the number of subgroups that are generated by the
generator G and order n. We have the relation n · h = #E. For ECDLP
security, large prime order n and small cofactor h is desired.
2.5 Special type of curves
This section covers additional types of elliptic curves that are used in ECC.
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2.5.1 Edwards Curves
Edwards curves are a family of elliptic curves that were first introduced by
Harold Edwards, in 2007. The original curve discussed by Edwards was a
normal form of elliptic curve with the equation [9]
x2 + y2 = a2 + a2x2y2.
Bernstein and Lange presented formulas for fast addition and point doubling
of the coordinates on the Edwards curve. They generalized the addition law
to the curves x2 + y2 = a2 + a2x2y2 which covers more elliptic curves over a
finite field than x2 + y2 = a2 + a2x2y2. These curves are isomorphic to the
curve [3]
x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2. (1)
We refer to such curves as Edwards Curves.
2.5.2 Twisted Edwards Curve
An Edwards curve is a twisted Edwards curve with a = 1 [3].
Definition 2 : Fix a field K with char(K) 6= 2. Fix distinct nonzero
elements a, d ∈ K. The twisted Edwards curve with coefficients a and d is the
curve
EE,a,d : ax
2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2.











Point doubling on twisted Edwards curve P = Q = (x1, y1) is given as:













Curve 448 is an Edwards curve designed by Mike Hamburg. It provides up to
224 bits of security [14]. Curve 448 is one of the curve that can be used in
Signal protocol and WhatsApp Messenger. The parameters of the curve 448
defined as per the RFC 7748 [18] are:
p 2448 − 2224 − 1
d −39081









X(G) and Y (G) are the (x, y) coordinates of the base point G.
2.5.4 Montgomery Curves
Montgomery curve is another form of elliptic curve that was introduced by
Peter Montgomery in 1987. A Montgomery curve defined over field K is
equivalent to a twisted Edwards curve over a field K [3].
Definition 3 : Fix a field K with char(K) 6= 2. Let A ∈ K\{−2, 2} and
B ∈ K\{0}. Montgomery curve is defined as
EM,A,B : Bv
2 = u2 + Au2 + u.
This equivalence between both the curves is called birational equivalence
because there exists a mapping ϕ : E1 → E2 and an inverse mapping
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ϕ−1 : E2 → E1 between the points on twisted Edwards curve and Mont-
gomery curve. Given a point on any one curve, we can obtain an equivalent
point on Montgomery curve using the mapping [3].
The birational maps between the curves:






























Curve 25519 is a popular curve that was introduced by Dan Bernstein in
2005. Curve 25519 is widely used in Signal protocol, WhatsApp Messenger,
Secure Shell, Transport Layer Security and cryptocurrencies like ZCash.
The parameters of the curve 25519 defined as per the RFC 7748 [18] are:
p 2255 − 19
A 486662






U(G) and V (G) are the (u, v) coordinates of the base point G.
2.5.6 Koblitz Curves
Koblitz curves are defined over binary fields GF(2k). They were introduced
by Neal Koblitz.
Definition 4 : Fix a binary field K. Let a ∈ K\{0, 1} and B ∈ K\{1}.
Koblitz curve is defined as
EK,a : y
2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + 1.
Koblitz are not adopted as widely as other families of curves. Due to security
problems, they may be deprecated in the future.
2.6 Verification of birational maps between Curve25519
and Ed25519
The equation of the Curve25519 is given as
v2 = u2 + 486662u2 + u mod 2255 − 19.
and the coordinates of the generator G are (Gu, Gv). Now, we derive an
edwards curve birationally equivalent to Curve25519 using the maps discussed















The curve that is birationally equivalent to the Curve25519 is
486664x2 + y2 = 1 + 486660x2y2 mod 2255 − 19.










The value of generator can be verified by substituting it in the formula above.
The Edwards curve Ed25519 defined in RFC 8032 has a different equation
than derived above. This is due to a scaling and substitution factor that is
out of scope for this thesis.
2.7 Contribution to thesis goals
This section contributes to goal G1. To generate an elliptic curve, it is
important to understand the underlying concepts of elliptic curves and its
group operations. In this section we cover the background required for
studying the generation of elliptic curves.
17
3 Counting Points on Elliptic Curves
An important problem to study while constructing ECs is counting points on
an EC. The total number of points on an EC is denoted by #E. Counting
points is essential for determining the order of the curve, which is not a trivial
task. The total number of points on the EC is also called as order of an EC.
For a curve to be secure, the order of the curve must be a large prime p or a
large prime p times a very small cofactor h.
A cofactor h = 1 gives optimal security and having a small cofactor can
provide performance enhancements [11]. In order to make the subgroup
attack infeasible, the order of the curve should have a large prime factor.
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm can be used to attack the group of order n, but
the attack becomes hard if the order of subgroup is a large prime. Stinson
suggests that, for a curve to be resistant against ECDLP attacks, the order
of subgroup of the curve should be ≥ 2224 [23].
To construct ECC, we have to calculate the order of the curve. Finding
the order of the curve however is not a trivial job. Hasse’s theorem gives us
an approximation of #E.
Hasse’s Theorem: Given an elliptic curve E over Zp, the number of points
on the curve denoted by #E is bounded by [19]
p+ 1− 2√p ≤ #E ≤ p+ 1 + 2√p.
One way to compute the order of the curve by a naive approach, that is by
substituting all the elements of Fp in the curve equation. However, that would
be an exhaustive task for a large p. Luckily, algorithms such as Schoof’s and
SEA can compute #E in polynomial time.
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3.1 Point counting algorithms
Schoof’s Algorithm:
Schoof’s algorithm is used to count the points on the curve. It is very ef-
ficient when the field of the curve is larger than 2160. The complexity of
this algorithm is O(ln8p). To understand this algorithm, lot of concepts of
advanced number theory are required which we will study during the thesis
work. The idea behind Schoof’s algorithm is to compute trace of Frobenius
t mod l such that l is a small prime number in K and then use Chinese
remainder theorem to compute t. Then we can compute #E = p + 1 − t
[1]. Sundriyal suggests improvement in Schoof’s algorithm by using Shank’s
BSGS algorithm within the internal searching of l. This can further increase
the speed of the algorithm [24].
Schoof-Elkies-Atkins (SEA) algorithm:
SEA algorithm is an improvement over Schoof’s algorithm. The drawback of
Schoof’s algorithm is with the degree of division polynomials. SEA algorithm
deals with this drawback of Schoof’s algorithm and presents an improvement.
It reduces the complexity of the algorithm from O(ln8p) to O(ln5p). This
algorithm can count the order of curve over Fp with p over 500 digits [24].
3.2 Experimental work
We calculate the order of the curves using Schoof’salgorithm. We used a
compiled binary of Schoof’s algorithm, authored by Michael Scott which
is found in MIRACL library. The purpose of the experiment was to test the
Schoof’s algorithm software’s correctness and efficiency. To cross refer-
ence the efficiency, we compute the order of same curves with SageMath.
SageMath uses Schoof-Elkies-Atkin (SEA) algorithm which is an improved
over Schoof’s algorithm to compute the order of the curves. The detailed
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Figure 2: Schoof’s algorithm taken from [24]
output of our experiments can be found in appendix 1.
Schoof’s algorithm can count the points on a Weierstrass curve. SEA
algorithm in SageMath can count points on the Montgomery and Weierstrass
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Figure 3: Schoof-Elkies-Atkins (SEA) algorithm taken from [24]
curves. Hence, using birational mappings, we use Wei2551 which is a Weier-
strass form of Curve25519. Similarly, for Edwards curves, we use birational
mappings to convert them to appropriate Montgomery or Weierstrass form in
order to compute order of the curve.
3.2.1 Curve25519









































4 Curve Generation and Verification
Elliptic curves are the basis of an ECC. However, there is not a single
standardized curve that is used throughout all ECC. There are atleast 8
standards that define different types of ECs. Each standard tries to ensure
that ECC computations are efficient and ECDLP is hard [5].
There are total 20 curves that are evaluated by Dan Bernstein and Tanja
Lange. These curves are determined as secure if they satisfy all the SafeCurves
requirements. Each one of these curves have a different set of parameters
for efficiency like different fields, shapes and size of cofactor. The curves
that satisfy the SafeCurves criteria are gaining popularity in their usage.
Curve25519 and Curve4448 are two such curves that are used in end-to-end
encryption protocols, digital signature algorithms and key exchange protocols.
Jubjub which is a twisted Edwards curve is used in crytpocurrencies like
Zcash [12]. Due to their gaining popularity, studying the generation of these
curves is important.
Wozny examines the domain parameters for generation of curves used in
ECC, defined by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards, American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), Secure and Efficient Cryptography
Group (SECG) for binary Galois fields [25].
While Wozny discusses the curve generation and parameter validation of curves
in Galois fields, a question that arises is, how to transparently generate curves
that are secure? Transparent generation of curves mean that anyone can
verify the curve parameters and there are no Nothing-up-my-sleeve numbers
in those curve parameters.
Flori et al. [11] discuss this very question where they propose the a list of
requirements that should be satisfied by an EC to be deemed as “secure”.
They also propose a method to generate and verify EC in a transparent
method.
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In this section we focus on the generation of “secure” elliptic curve. We study
the cryptographic criteria that a curve should follow and propose our pair of
“secure” curves. We implement the algorithm that can generate Montgomery
curves which satisfy SafeCurves criteria. We explain the verification process
of these curves using the SafeCurves verification tool.
4.1 Criteria for cryptographic ECs
To select a curve for cryptographic use, we have to consider the following
criteria [11]
1. The ECDLP problem should be hard under the defined parameters of
the curve.
2. EC should be such that it can be implemented to be resistant against
side channel attacks.
3. Normality conditions should be satisfied by the curve in order to be
secure against some particularly unknown attacks.
4. Implementation of the curve should be convenient.
5. Special families of curves used for specific protocols and algorithms.
6. Generation of the curve should be verifiable.
4.1.1 Hardness ECDLP problem
The security of the curve is determined by the hardness of ECDLP problem
against known attacks. Flori et al. suggest some criteria required to generate
a curve which which provides security against such known ECDLP attacks.
The curve should be a non-singualar curve i.e the discriminant 4a3 + 27b2
should be equal to 0. The order n of the curve should be a product of large
prime number and a very small co-factor h = n/p. Small cofactor provides
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security and performance improvements. Flori et al. recommend that the
cofactor h should be 1, whereas there are other secure curves that have
cofactor h > 1. It is recommended to define the curve over a prime field
or binary Galois field GF (2m) in order to provide resistance against index
calculus computations [11]. The cost of computing Pollard Rho should be
greater that 2100. ECDLP security does not ensure ECC security. There are
other attacks that undermine the security of the curve while being ECDLP
resistant [5].
4.1.2 Implementation dependent security
Improper implementation of the curve can make a cryptosystem vulnerable
to side channel attacks. Even the choice of the curve can be a factor, as some
curves are vulnerable to side channel attacks. Flori et al. suggest a few criteria
to improve the security of the curve implementation. Namely, the curve should
not have a small subgroup. Having special points on the curve can make the
curve susceptible to side channel attacks. The special points of an EC are
points (x, y) such that one of the two coordinates of is zero. The base field
of the curve should not be a special prime number. There are some curves
like Curve25519 or SM2 that are defined over a prime field Fp, where p is a
special prime number like pseudo-Mersenne or generalized Mersenne number.
The fields based on these numbers have benefits like fast computations but
they are susceptible to side-channel attacks [11]. SafeCurves require the base
field to be prime and p ≡ 1 mod 4 or p ≡ 3 mod 4. Curves defined in special
prime number field meet the SafeCurves criteria [5].
4.1.3 Normality of the curve
Flori et al. present the properties that random curves should satisfy with
overwhelming probability. They insist these conditions does not make the
curve secure against precise attacks, but if they are not met then it would
make the curve slightly vulnerable. The conditions are:
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• Cardinality of the quadratic twist
The order of the quadratic twist has influence on the security of the
curve. The order of quadratic twist should be large for the ECDLP
problem to be hard.
• Non-special base field
Special prime number is a number when it is a value of a polynomial of
a low degree with small coefficients evaluated at a small value [11]. Flori
et al. argue that there are no known attacks against curves with special
parameters such as Curve25519 or FIPS 186-2 curves, it is legitimate
to consider them as exceptional. However, using special primes can be
advantageous in certain cases as they allow faster arithmetic operations.
Hence, we will use special prime for generating Montgomery curves due
the curve properties.
• Embedding degree
Embedding degree of E is the smallest integer e such that q divides
pe − 1 where q is the largest prime divisor of the order of the curve n
and p is the prime field. This is an expensive computation since we
have to factor q − 1. While computing the twist security, we have to
compute the embedding degree of the of the twist. Hence, we have to
perform perform this task twice.
• Multiplicative group of the base field
If p− 1 is smooth then the multiplicative discrete logarithm problem
is easy. A number is smooth if its prime divisors are small. This
computation is done only once.
• Discriminant of the endomorphism ring
The discriminant of the endomorphism ring should be large. SafeCurves
require the discriminant to be larger than 2100 [5].
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• Class number
Flori et al. suggest that the class number of the curve should be at least
p1/4 [11]. However, SafeCurves does not include class number require-
ment as it argues that class number can be derived from discriminant
of the endomorphism ring. Hence, does not incorporate class number
requirement [5].
The endomorphism of the curve gives us information of the structure of the
curve. Curves with endomorphism rings with Z-rank 4 are vulnerable curves
[15]. The class number of the curve should also be large.
4.1.4 Convenience of implementation of the curve
The curve should be convenient to implement without affecting its security.
If the number of points n is greater than p then it would be infeasible to
represent n− 1 numbers in the give memory space for a large p. If p ≡ 3 mod
4 then it would be efficient to use point compression method of representing
points (x, y) of E. Selecting a special prime number can help in performing
fast base field arithmetic but Flori et al. suggest that it would affect the
optimal security of the curve. They recommenced using base fields which are
more general. Using a special coefficient to perform fast arithmetic might be
beneficial but it might be a security risk [11].
4.2 Generating an EC
Flori et al. propose a method to generate and validate a curve. They propose
a program that generates a curve with parameters and another program that
validates whether the parameters are cryptographically safe or not. They do
not mention the method of checking the conditions that were mentioned in
above sections. There are three conditions that are computationally expensive
to check, which are checking the order of the curve and whether the curve
has a small cofactor, computing the endomorphism ring and class number
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and finally computing the embedding degree of the curve.
They present a toy example for generation and verification of the curve.
Each curve would have a certificate that determines whether the curve is
“good” or not. If the curve is good, then they present the proof of all the
criteria of the curve.
Baier and Buchmann propose two methods to generate suitable EC group.
Random approach, where the parameters of the EC are generated randomly
and tested for their security and complex multiplication approach, which uses
complex multiplication theory to generate a suitable group [2].
NIST SP 800-186 recommends a criteria that the curves should satisfy to
be cryptographic. It proposes criteria for different families of curves like,
weierstrass curves defined over prime and binary fields, Montgomery curves,
Edwards curves and pseudo-random curves. We focus on security criteria
of Montgomery and Edwards curve since they are used in Signal protocol.
Edwards curve can be derived from Montgomery curve, hence our focus in
this thesis will be generation of Montgomery curves.
We use the security criteria determined by NIST SP 800-186 to generate
Montgomery curves. We analyse the performance for generating the curve
parameters by using random approach. And finally we provide a “certification”
of the security of the curve by using Safecurves verification tool.
4.3 Verification of an EC
Verification of ECs requires testing the parameters of curve for ECDLP and
ECC security. Dan Bernstein and Tanja Lange have published a tool for
verification of ECs. Safecurves criteria does not consider efficiency issues
while verifying a curve. The authors argue that efficiency related requirements
actually damage the efficiency and in some cases it is bad for the security of
the curve [5]. We used this tool to verify the generated curve for its security.
The tool is written in Sage and it takes input a directory that has multiple
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files. Each file contains some information about the generated curves. The
file names and information are as follows:
• p: the field that the curve is defined in (decimal).
• |G|: the prime order of the generator point Gs (decimal).
• G(x1): x-coordinate of the G.
• G(y1): y-coordinate of the G.
• P (x): x-coordinate of a point P , where P generates the entire curve.
• P (y): y-coordinate of a point P , where P generates the entire curve.
• shape: the curve shape, namely shortw or montgomery or edwards.
– If shape is “shortw”: a and b coefficients of weierstrass curve.
– If shape is “montgomery”: A and B coefficients of montgomery
curve.
– If shape is “edwards”: d coefficient of the edwards curve.
• primes: all prime divisors of
– prime field p
– curve order p+ 1− tr, where tr is trace of elliptic curve
– twist order p+ 1 + tr
– tr2 − 4 · p
– recursive prime divisors of all e− 1 where e is the element in the
list.
The program returns output with multiple files that helps us interpret
the verification of elliptic curve. All files with name “verify-*” contain the
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verification of properties of the curve. If the curve passes all the SafeCurves
criteria, then the file “verify-safecurve” will have the value as True. Files
with name “hex-*” contain hexadecimal representation of the parameters
of the curve. Other files include proof of the primality of the numbers and
representation of numbers in the power of 2.
4.4 Security criteria for Montgomery curves
Montgomery curve is another special type of which is used in ECC where
fast x-point scalar multiplication is desired. It is defined by the equation:
EM,A,B : By
2 = x3 + Ax2 + x mod p, for A,B ∈ p and B(A2 − 4) 6= 4.
The value of the desired cofactor depends on the field p. If p = 1 mod
4, then the desired order of the curve and its twist are {4, 8},{8, 4}. If we
choose the first pair of cofactors, then the order of twist is greater than the
order of the curve. Which would increase the computation for algorithms
that take cofactors into account since might also check for points on the twist.
Hence, we chose the cofactors {8, 4}.
If p = 3 mod 4, then the desired cofactor of twist and curve is {4, 4} [18].
The requirements for the parameters A and B as per the NIST 186 standards
are:
• The value of B should be 1.
• The value of A is selected as the minimum value where the following
conditions should be satisfied:
– The curve is cyclic implies that A2 − 4 is not a square in GF(p).
– The curve has cofactor of h = 4 or h = 8 implies that A+ 2 is a
square in GF(p).
– The quadratic twist E‘ of the curve should have cofactor of h = 4.
– A has the form A ≡ 2 mod 4.
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• Select base point G = (XG, YG) such that |XG| is minimal and YG is
odd.
We have used the above criteria and created an algorithm that can be
used to generate secure Montgomery curves. The time complexity of the
algorithm increases as the field k increases. The time complexity can be
decreased further by using more processors. Note that this algorithm runs
only once to get the desired parameters.
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Algorithm 1: Generate A
Result: A
Initialize k = field
for A in range (1, k, 1) do
if A%4 == 2 then
if kronecker(A ∗ ∗2− 4, k) == −1 then
if kronecker(A+ 2, k) == −1 then
ec = EllipticCurve(GF (k), [0, A, 0, 1, 0])
order = ec.order()
factors = factor(ft)
if (factors[0] == (2,2) and (len(factors) == 2) and
isprime(factors[1][0])) then
trace = k+1 - order
order of twist = k + 1 + trace
factor of twist = factor(order of twist)
if factor of twist[0] == (2,2) and









One feature of Montgomery curve is its relationship with twisted Edwards
curve. Ever Montgomery curve is birationally equivalent to twisted Edwards
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curve and vice versa. We can derive a twisted Edwards curve from the any
Montgomery curve using the given formula:
EE,a,d →EM,A,B: A = 2(a+d)a−d and B =
4
a−d









EM,A,B →EE,a,d: a = A+2B and d =
A−2
B








Using the above formula, we can derive any Edwards curve from a Mont-
gomery curve.
4.5 Time analysis of computing A
The amount of time require to generate the parameter A is dependent on
the size of the field p. As discussed in 4.4, the desired order of the curve
when p = 3 mod 4 should be 4. Hence, we all the curves generated below
have the cofactor 4 and twist cofactor also 4. The RFC 7748 emphasises on
choosing the minimal value of A for performance and simplicity reasons. So
we iterate from 3 to 109, to find the minimal value of A that satisfies the
criteria discussed in 4.4. We observe that as the size of field increases, the
time required to find the value of A also increases.
As discussed in 4.4, the desired order of the curve when p = 1 mod 4
should be 8. Hence, we all the curves generated below have the cofactor 8 and
twist cofactor also 4. We observe that as the size of field increases, the time
required to find the value of A also increases. The time required to compute
A is smaller when p = 1 mod 4 compared to when p = 3 mod 4.
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In 4.5, the value of A is calculated by iteratively searching from 3 to 109 such
that it is minimal. However in some cases, finding the value of randomized
A is takes less time compared to the iterative method. This does not en-
sure performance since the values of A are larger in size than iterative method.
Similar to the above, finding the value of randomized A in some cases take
less time compared to the iterative method. As the size of field increases, the
time required to find A is less than than the iterative method.
Field Bits Time (in sec) A h
599 10 0.0801 262 4
1283 11 0.0293 134 4
4079 12 0.024 130 4
46499 16 0.034 30 4
762871 20 0.057 274 4
1071919 25 0.387 2890 4
2835035807 32 0.204 730 4
298291166879 40 0.078 186 4
1043659579451143 45 1.44 2718 4
1043659579451143 50 2.38 1278 4
27523857120632423 55 35.89 9634 4
865827640841390683 60 17.63 8256 4
10480660404865665031 64 57.54 12694 4
426737804570514267864967 79 1038.27 65526 4
Table 1: Computing A iteratively, where p = 3 mod 4
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Field Bits Time (in sec) A h
641 10 0.007 10 8
1601 11 0.162 1142 8
2749 12 0.190 226 8
7433 16 0.042 38 8
30389 20 0.181 538 8
12017497 25 0.655 3190 8
28043401 32 0.084 234 8
588858461273 40 0.496 838 8
13565825784053 45 1.145 1206 8
233132441592313 50 7.074 4738 8
10618124951016833 55 7.523 2390 8
903670300601356697 60 79.154 22750 8
18208804115091945829 64 32.510 6462 8
385274230067896555822949 79 76.053 3438 8







46499 16 0.107 43798 461 4
762871 20 0.047 81578 186 4
1071919 25 0.068 349970 375 4
2835035807 32 0.357 2363480646 1060 4
298291166879 40 2.43 219835422630 3975 4
25157323951583 45 5.32 16092897198902 3762 4
1043659579451143 50 40.782 778655335914022 14137 4
27523857120632423 55 157.227 498878990099714 20835 4
865827640841390683 60 56.326 348429176562426818 17798 4
10480660404865665031 64 100.78 374416011502485650 21921 4
426737804570514267864967 79 58.541 180859438044348245316778 3000 4








641 10 0.131 90 53 8
1601 11 0.206 1390 1215 8
3461 12 0.024 3330 51 8
7433 16 0.022 5714 99 8
30389 20 0.041 810 321 8
12017497 25 0.122 7994794 622 8
28043401 32 0.337 15746794 1667 8
588858461273 40 1.485 229167062922 3407 8
13565825784053 45 4.0795 7939611849078 5425 8
233132441592313 50 1.360 64243845514354 1043 8
10618124951016833 55 32.318 174100300926558 9353 8
903670300601356697 60 55.836 188144657425353126 11173 8
385274230067896555822949 79 68.898 377311557684493588940514 2208 8
Table 4: Computing A randomly, where p = 1 mod 4
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4.5.1 Iterative vs random search for A parameter
The proposed method in RFC 7748 for generating A, states that the value of
A should be minimum such that it passes the necessary security criteria [18].
For a curve with field p > 2100, the time required to find A iteratively is more
than the finding A randomly.
For a field p = 289 − 1, we get the value of A iteratively in 882.5 sec-
onds while randomly finding A would take 167.7 seconds. Initially we find
random element in the range of (3, 109), then after getting the value we reduce
the range again to find the next random value of A. We do this till we get
the lowest value of A that matches with our iterative value. If we set the
appropriate range then finding the value of A randomly is faster than the
iterative method. This method gives us different values of A that can be used
for generating ECC. However, the value of A, when generated randomly does
not meet the aforementioned security criteria. But it can still be a used as
an ephemeral curve.
Random generation method cannot be verified by any third party and the
curve could be dismissed as suspicious. Using a CSPRNG can mitigate the
suspicion for generating ephemeral curves.
Field Bits Time (in sec) A h
289 − 1 89 882.535 32290 4
2107 − 1 107 * * 4
Table 5: Iterative computation of A
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Field Bits Time (in sec) A tries Range
289 − 1 89 167.792 470642746 6269 (3, 109)
1443.514 114920138 58867 (3, 470642746)
87.067 34793102 3626 (3, 114920138)
1336.258 59682 62398 (3, 34793102)
497.891 32290 22523 (3, 59682)
2107 − 1 107 151.403 806450534 3326 (3, 109)
755.403 671948038 17705 (3, 806450534)
4711.379 533718842 100001 (3, 671948038)
255.761 41371402 6104 (3, 533718842)
1704.339 16700578 46659 (3, 41371402)
248.273 14663590 4235 (3, 16700578)
2935.074 11784278 41908 (3, 14663590)
1584.776 582346 42530 (3, 11784278)
1465.827 211982 42339 (3, 11784278)
Table 6: Random computation of A
4.6 End-to-End Encryption Debate
WhatsApp is the most popular messaging application in the world with more
than 1.5 billion users. Ever since Facebook had bought WhatsApp in 2014, con-
cerns about privacy had increased amongst the tech community as Facebook
does not have a stellar record in maintaining user privacy [10]. Forbes jour-
nalist Kalev Leetaru recently wrote about Facebook’s plan to backdoor
WhatsApp for client side content scanning and filtering. However, further
inspection concluded that Facebook does not plan to implement a back-
door on WhatsApp at all and what Leetaru reported had very little to do
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with WhatsApp and more about content filtering on Facebook using AI [20].
Facebook’s malpractices with user privacy has put the company and its
products under the scrutiny by privacy experts throughout the globe. The
cryptographic protocols behind WhatsApp are deemed as secure and they do
provide end-to-end encryption, however there are other issues that affect the
user privacy. A backdoor that can record the user’s screen activity can read
the WhatsApp messages without even affecting the E2E protocol. Facebook
or any highly motivated party can still read the WhatsApp messages due to
improper implementation of user data storage [26]. While the underlying
cryptosystems are secure, assuring privacy and security to the users under
the guise of end-to-end encryption is a bit misleading. Better alternatives like
Signal messenger should be used, which is an open source software unlike
WhatsApp.
4.7 Contribution to thesis goals
In this section, we focus on goals G4 and G5. We have gone through all
the necessary criteria required for a curve to satisfy to be deemed as secure.
Adhering to these requirements, we would generate curve parameters and
check if the curve passes all the necessary requirements. Once the generated
curve passes all the necessary requirements, the next step would be to compute
the order of the generated curve and finally test the ECDLP security of the
curve.
40
5 Attacks on ECDLP
In this section we will focus on algorithms that solve ECDLP. Algorithms such
as Shanks algorithm, Pollard rho algorithm and Pohlig-Hellman algorithm
can solve the ECDLP problem in fields that can be considered small for
cryptographic use.
While generating a secure EC, we have to choose the domain parameters such
that ECDLP problem is hard. The algorithms that solve ECDLP should find
it infeasible to solve ECDLP under the recommended parameters.
5.1 Shanks Algorithm
Shanks’ Algorithm is a meet-in-middle algorithm to solve ECDLP. The
algorithm works as follows [13]:




3. for i← 0 to m− 1 compute and store iP
4. for j ← 0 to m− 1 compute and store Q− jmP
5. Sort both the lists
6. Search through both the lists to find collision such that iP = Q− jmP




A modification to Shanks’ baby step giant step (BSGS) algorithm is proposed
by Bernstein and Lange [6].
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5.2 Pollard Rho
As discussed in section 5.1, Shanks algorithm has space and time complexity
of O(
√
n). For large numbers, this algorithm becomes expensive to compute
and store. Pollard rho is an improvement over Shanks as it requires less
storage compared to Shanks and can be parallelised [13]. Pollard rho can be
used to solve DLP and ECDLP problems. In this section we will focus on
Pollard rho for attacking ECDLP.
The algorithm works as follows [7]:
1. Partition the curve E (points on the curve) defined over F2k into three
equal subsets of S such that S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 = S
2. Blumenfeld suggests that we can do step 1 by either reducing x-
coordinate modulo 3 or use projective coordinate and reduce y-coordinates
modulo 3 [7].
3. Now select a random base point α modulo n such that A0 = αP (Refer
5 for P )
4. Ai+1 = f(Ai) =
{ Ai + P if Ai ∈ S1,
2Ai if Ai ∈ S2,
Ai +Q if Ai ∈ S3.
The sequence Ai takes up the form Ai = aiP + bjQ
5. If Ai1 = Ai2, then we get aj1P + bj1Q = ai2P + bj2Q
6. We get
aj1−aj2
bj1−bj2 P = Q
7. if gcd(bj2 − bj1, n) = 1, then aj1−aj2bj1−bj2 is easy to calculate.
if gcd(bj2 − bj1, n) = d > 1, then we can compute aj1−aj2bj1−bj2 mod (N/d).
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The above algorithm for curves defined over field F2k but it can be extended
to the curves defined over a prime field Fp.
The Pollard rho can be enhanced or its speed can be increased using different
concepts. Brent’s cycle finding algorithm speeds up the algorithm by 24%.
Pollard rho can be parallelized using multiple processors. Automorphism can
be also be used to speed up the algorithm. Faster and efficient algorithms
can be used to save a lot of gcd computations [8].
The sequences made in the above algorithm are called walks. There has
been subsequent amount of research done to change the number of walks and
examine the complexity of the algorithm. Kangaroo method and Gaudry-
Schost are different versions of Pollard rho algorithm. Kangaroo method is
suitable for intervals of N (where N < ord(P)). Compared to pollard rho,
the steps in pseudorandom walks are small. Gaudry-Schost method is a
combination of Pollard rho and Kangaroo method where the algorithm uses
small jumps and is analysed using the birthday paradox [13].
SafeCurves criteria require the order of the curve to be greater than 2200.
The most efficient Pollard rho algorithm would require around 0.886 ∗
√
order
times addition operations [5]. By using this criteria, we can be certain that
no curve would be vulnerable to pollard rho attack for a distant future.
5.3 Pohlig-Hellman
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm solves the DLP problem by reducing the problem
into prime subgroups of P [22]. The best known attack on ECDLP is by
using a combination of Pohlig-Hellman and Pollard rho algorithm. The worse
case complexity of Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is O(
√
n). The order of the base
point |G| is divisible by the order of the curve. For the curve to be secure,
the order of the base point |G| should be greater than 2200. Pohlig-Hellman
finishes faster if the the order |G| has prime factors. The base points of
Curve272 and Curve224 are prime and greater than 2200, hence they are
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resistant against Pohlig-Hellman attack.
5.4 Experimental work
We implement Pollard rho algorithm in SageMath to solve ECLDP. To test
the correctness of our implementation, we take a small Montgomery curve
y2 = x3 + 54x2 + x mod 8191. Consider a point P and Q on the curve such
that P = mQ, where m is a random number. Using our implementation of
Pollard rho, we have to find m. To run this experiment, we take a random
point P and Q and find the arbitrary m. Once we find m, we verify P = mQ.
The following code returns the value of m = 354, which is correct.









if f_bucket(x) == "S1":
return [x+P ,a % n,(b+1) % n]
elif f_bucket(x) == "S2":
return [x+x,(2*a)%n, (2*b)%n]
elif f_bucket(x) == "S3":
return [Q+x, (a+1)%n, b%n]
def pollard_rho(G,n,P,Q):
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[x,a,b] = f(K, 0, 0, P, Q, n,G)
[x2,a2,b2] = f(x,a,b,P,Q,n,G)
while((a*P + b*Q)!=(a2*P + b2*Q)):
[x,a,b] = f(x, a, b, P, Q, n,G)
[x2,a2,b2] = f(x2, a2, b2, P, Q, n,G)
[x2,a2,b2] = f(x2, a2, b2, P, Q, n,G)




5.5 Contribution to thesis goals
This section focuses on goal G5. The safe curves we generated are resistant
against ECDLP solving algorithms like Pollard rho and Pohlig-Hellman.
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Part II




In the above examples, we have generated curves that are insecure and
not suitable for cryptography purpose. In this section, we propose a Curve224
which can be used in ECC. Due to its security strength, it cannot be used
in Signal protocol, but it can be used for other ECC applications that use
ECDH and ECDSA. There is a Weierstrass curve nistp224 approved by NIST
that is defined over the same field. Nistp224 is not considered safe as per the
SafeCurves criteria. The generation of nistp224 parameters are suspicious
[5]. Hence, we want to propose a Montgomery curve in the same field but
which passes the SafeCurves criteria.
Field choice:
We use a NIST approved Solinas prime number 2224 − 296 + 1. We use
the same field to generate a more secure EC. This prime is 224 bits long,
hence it can be efficiently represented as a multiple of computer word size
[16]. This is helpful in generation of crytographic protocols.
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Curve coefficients:
We generate a Montgomery curve of the form:
By2 = x3 + Ax2 + x
The parameter B is set to 1. The value of A is 64486, which is the minimum
value that satisfies all the criteria. We can verify that A is a nothing-up-my-
sleeve number using the algorithm 1. This curve is satisfies all the SafeCurves
criteria.
The order of the curve is




and the order of twist is





The generator G of the curve should be a point with lowest possible u-







We use SafeCurves verification tool to demonstrate the security of the
Curve224. The curve passes all the security criteria. We can demonstrate the
transparent generation of the curve using the algorithm 1. The output of the
tool can be found here.
47
Field p prime True
Equation y2 = x3 + 64486x2 + x True
Base G on curve True
Table 7: Parameters
Rho rho above 2100 True
Transfer safe against additive/multiplicative
transfer
True
Discriminants |D| above 2100 True
Rigid rigid True
Table 8: ECDLP security
Ladder montgomery ladder True
Twist cost of combined attack above 2100 True
Completeness complete single/multi-scalar formulas True
Indistinguishability supports indistinguishability True
Table 9: ECC security
6.2 Curve272
Motivation:
Curve224 satisfies the SafeCurves criteria, however it is less secure com-
pared to Curve25519. Our main goal of this thesis is to generate a curve
that is secure and can be used as an alternative EC for cryptography purpose
especially in Signal protocol. The two existing curves that are already used
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in Signal are Curve25519 and Curve448. The former is used widely in other
ECC while the latter is considered as an “overkill” curve due to its large field.
We propose a new curve in order to diversify the choices of elliptic curves. In
order to generate this curve, we follow the SafeCurves security criteria and
the NIST 186 standards.
Field choice:
In order to generate a secure curve, we need to define the curve in a large
field such that the ECDLP problem is hard to solve. We choose the prime
field p = 2272 − 240 − 1, which is a Solinas prime number. Solinas prime
numbers are widely used in cryptography, especially in ECC [16].
Curve coefficients:
We generate a Montgomery curve of the form:
By2 = x3 + Ax2 + x
The parameter B is set to 1. The value of A is 22042, which is the minimum
value that satisfies all the criteria. We can verify that A is a nothing-up-my-
sleeve number using the algorithm 1. This curve is satisfies all the SafeCurves
criteria.
The order of the curve is




and the order of twist is





The generator G of the curve should be a point with lowest possible u-









We use SafeCurves verification tool to demonstrate the security of the
Curve272. Our curve passes all the security requirements and is determined
as “safe”. The output of the tool can be found here.
Field p prime True
Equation y2 = x3 + 22042x2 + x True
Base G on curve True
Table 10: Parameters
Rho rho above 2100 True
Transfer safe against additive/multiplicative
transfer
True
Discriminants |D| above 2100 True
Rigid rigid True
Table 11: ECDLP security
Ladder montgomery ladder True
Twist cost of combined attack above 2100 True
Completeness complete single/multi-scalar formulas True
Indistinguishability supports indistinguishability True
Table 12: ECC security
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6.3 Toy EC
To demonstrate the criteria for generation of curves, we create a small EC
with crytographically insignificant parameters. The process to generate
crytographically secure curves is the same, except the time required to generate
and verify the parameters will vary.
6.3.1 Curve31
Generating a Montgomery curve based on the NIST criteria is essential for
its security. We choose a field Fp with p = 231 − 1, which is 32 bits long
Mersenne prime number. The reason we chose this field is because it is not
computationally expensive to run experiments such as finding A parameter
or computing all private keys. The value of B is 1 and we have to find the
minimum value of A that satisfies all the security criteria. We have the curve
EM,A,B : y
2 = x3 + 6222x2 + x mod 2147483647.
The curve has the cofactor h = 4 and the order of the curve is 536855567
which is prime. The cofactor of the quadratic twist of EM,A,B is 4. Using the
birational maps, we generate Ed32
EE,a,d : 6224y
2 + y2 = 1 + 6220x2y2 mod 2147483647.
We will use Curve32 to demonstrate ECDL attacks on elliptic curves.
6.3.2 Curve61
We choose a field F261 − 1, which is 61 bits long Mersenne prime number.
The value of B is 1 and we have to find the minimum value of A that satisfies
all the security criteria. We have the curve,
EM,A,B : y
2 = x3 + 50042x2 + x mod 2305843009213693951
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The curve has the cofactor h = 4 and the order of the curve is 576460752120095597
which is prime. The cofactor of the quadratic twist of EM,A,B is 4. Using the
birational maps, we generate Ed61
EE,a,d : 50044y
2 + y2 = 1 + 50040x2y2 mod 2305843009213693951.
6.3.3 Ed1051
Twisted Edwards curve is a special type of elliptic curve that is used in
modern ECC. It has desired properties such as fast explicit addition and
doubling operations and birational relationship with other special curves.
Twisted Edwards curve is defined by the equation EE,a,d : ax
2+y2 = 1+dx2y2
over a non binary field k. The point addition formula is complete if a is a
square in k and d is a non-square in k. Using this criteria, we generate a toy
curve for field p = F1051. Note that an Edwards curve is just an twisted
Edwards curve with a = 1.
Using the defined conditions we generate a toy curve: −3x2 + y2 = 1 + 7x2y2
mod 1051. We can count the points on the curve using trivial brute force
method, but for large fields we will use Schoof’s or SEA algorithm.
6.4 Toy ECC
We use the generated Curves to construct toy cryptosystem. We choose to
construct a toy Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman(ECDH) cryptosystem because it
is used in Signal protocol. Diffie-Hellman key exchange requires fast curve
operations, hence implement birational mapping to convert our Montgomery
curve to Edwards curve. The code for this ECC can be found in appendix
6.4.1 EC arithmetic:
We implemented Edwards and Montgomery curve point arithmetic in C++
using GMP library. The point arithmetic of twisted edwards curve is complete.
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Hence, it is a preferred choice for digital signature algorithms.
Edwards curve point addition
The point arithmetic formulas can be found in section 2.5.2
//Returns R = P+Q
void add(R,P,Q,ECurve E){
Initialize xtop,ytop,xtemp,ytemp;
xtop = (P.X * Q.Y) + (Q.X * P.Y);
xtemp = 1 + d * P.X * P.Y * Q.X * Q.Y;
invert(xtemp,field);
xtop = xtop*xtemp;
ytop = (P.Y * Q.Y) - (a * P.X * Q.X);





To demonstrate the output of the following pseudocode. Consider two points
P and Q, we will add them to get the point R, R = P +Q. For the algorithm








R = P +Q = (422744914654425032788592804291108266031846638811930885879496
34779277119126512, 464596337676635957844047528609053781596479806341115261
62287976184015765756799)
Edwards curve point doubling
The point arithmetic formulas can be found in section 2.5.2




To demonstrate the output of the following pseudocode, we take the above point P










We implement double-and-add algorithm for scalar multiplication. This algorithm
is the simplest scalar multiplication algorithm amongst all other methods. This
algorithm calculates n ∗P using systematic point doubling and addition techniques.


















To demonstrate the correctness of the pseudocode, we take the above point P and
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multiply it with a random scalar value x = 5412. The point xP should lie on the








Montgomery ladder is a secure and side channel resistant scalar multiplication
algorithm. This algorithm computes a fixed number of steps regardless of the
value of scalar n. This property does not reveal any side channel information
like power or timing. Due to this property, it is widely used in key generation
and key exchange algorithms. As the name suggests, montgomery ladder can be
efficiently implemented using montgomery curves. The montgomery point addition
and doubling code can be found in appendix.
//Returns R = x*P
void Mladder(R,P,x,MontCurve M){
Point R0("0","1");
Point R1 = P;
Point temp0,temp1;
//value of x in binary
value_str = str(x,2)
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To demonstrate the montgomery ladder, we take the generator G of Curve25519
and multiply it by some arbitrary scalar 4541. The output point should lie on the
curve.
G = (9, 43114425171068552920764898935933967039370386198203806730763910
166200978582548)





Point compression is a method to represent the EC points in a compact way. We
have seen the representation of points in (x, y) coordinate system, but we can also
represent elliptic curve points by removing the y coordinate. This is due to the
property of elliptic curves defined over finite field. For every x coordinate, there are
two y coordinates. One of them is even and the other is odd. So we can represent
any EC point in a compressed format as (x, 0/1) where 0 is for even coordinate




if (y%2 == 0){
return str(x,0)
}




Take the generator G of Curve25519. The y coordinate of G is even so it can be
represented as (x, 0):
G = (9, 43114425171068552920764898935933967039370386198203806730763910
166200978582548)
G = (9, 0)
The main benefit of point compression is that the keys of EC can be represented
in a smaller size without compromising the security. Point decompression is the
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method of deriving the original point from a compressed point. Based on the y




t = x^3 + Ax^2 + x










G = (9, 0)




Several organizations define elliptic curve domain parameters and properties in
order to determine their security. Each standard proposes a set of rules to generate
curves and test vectors to verify them. Over the course of years, the organizations
have refined their standards to be well accepted by the cryptography community.
Bernstein and Lange argue that secure implementation of standard curve is theoret-
ically hard and none of the standards ensure a good job of providing ECC security.
There are other attacks that break ECC without solving ECDLP [5].
7.0.1 Curve catalog
Weierstrass Curves
Curve Bit strength Comments





W-25519 128 bits Weierstrass form of Curve25519
W-448 224 bits Weierstrass form of Curve448
Twisted Edwards Curves
Curve Bit strength Comments
Edwards25519 128 bits Used in Signal Protocol and EdDSA
Edwards448 224 bits Used in Signal Protocol and EdDSA
E448 224 bits Used in Signal Protocol and EdDSA.




Curve Bit strength Comments
Curve25519 128 bits Used in Signal Protocol
Curve448 224 bits Used in Signal Protocol
Koblitz curves
Curve Bit strength Comments
Curve K-163 82 bits For legacy use only
Curve K-283 142 bits
Curve K-409 205 bits
Curve K-571 286 bits
Pseudorandom curves
Curve Bit strength Comments
Curve B-163 82 bits For legacy use only
Curve B-283 142 bits
Curve B-409 205 bits
Curve B-571 286 bits
7.0.2 NIST SP 800-186
NIST SP 800-186 is a standard proposed by NIST for Digital Signtaures and
Ellipitic curve cryptography. This standard adds two new curves, Ed448 and
Ed25519 for EdDSA use. In addition, the standard advocates the use of ECDSA
and removal of DSA citing security analysis and growing popularity of ECDSA.
The NIST curves proposed in the document are as follows:
Weierstrass Curves
Weierstrass curves that are generated over prime fields P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384,
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and P-521 which have equation y2 = x3 + ax + b.























































2448 − 2224 − 1
Twisted Edwards Curves
Twisted Edwards Curve have equation ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
Curve a d p
Edwards25519 −1 −121665/121666 2255 − 19
Edwards448 1 −39081 2448 − 2224 − 1
E448 1 39082/39081 2448 − 2224 − 1
Montgomery Curves
Montgomery curves have equation By2 = x3 + Ax2 + x
Curve A B p
Curve25519 486662 1 2255 − 19
Curve448 156326 1 2448 − 2224 − 1
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Koblitz Curves
Koblitz curve has equation y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
Curve a b f(z)
Curve K-163 0 1 z233 + z74 + 1
Curve K-283 0 1 z283 + z12 + z7 + z5 + 1
Curve K-409 0 1 z409 + z8 + 1
Curve K-571 0 1 z571 + z10 + z5 + z2 + 1
Pseudorandom Curves
Pseudorandom curve has equation y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + b
Curve a b f(z)




z233 + z74 + 1
Curve B-283 1 0x27B680AC8B8596DA5A4AF8A1
9A0303FCA97FD7645309FA2
z283 + z12 + z7 + z5 + 1




z409 + z8 + 1






z571 + z10 + z5 + z2 + 1
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7.0.3 SEC 2
SEC 2 is a standard proposed by Certicom Research for elliptic curves domain
parameters. The SEC-2 curves proposed in the document are as follows:
192-bit Domain Parameters over Fp
Parameters of secp192k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, and secp192r1 are
associated with verifiably random parameters.
secp192k1












224-bit Domain Parameters over Fp
Parameters of secp224k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, and secp224r1 are
associated with verifiably random parameters.
secp224k1














256-bit Domain Parameters over Fp
Parameters of secp256k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, and secp256r1 are
associated with verifiably random parameters. Secp256k1 is a curve used in Bitcoin
cryptocurrency system. It is chosen because of its efficient and fast computation
properties. The parameters of Secp256k1 are verifiable and selected in a predicted
way such that it eliminates a possibility of having any backdoor.
secp256k1 (Bitcoin curve)
















384-bit Domain Parameters over Fp
secp384r1 curve is associated with verifiably random parameters.
secp384r1








521-bit Domain Parameters over Fp
secp521r1 curve is associated with verifiably random parameters.
secp521r1












163-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters over F2m
Parameters of sect163k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, sect163r1 and sect163r2
are associated with verifiably random parameters.
sect163k1


















233-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters over F2m
Parameters of sect233k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, sect233r1 are associ-
ated with verifiably random parameters.
sect233k1















239-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters over F2m
Parameters of sect239k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, sect239r1 are associ-
ated with verifiably random parameters.
sect239k1





283-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters over F2m
Parameters of sect283k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, sect283r1 are associ-
ated with verifiably random parameters.
sect283k1


















409-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters over F2m
Parameters of sect409k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, sect409r1 are associ-
ated with verifiably random parameters.
sect409k1



















571-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters over F2m
Parameters of sect571k1 are associated with a Koblitz curve, sect571r1 are associ-
ated with verifiably random parameters.
sect571k1
























7.1 Contribution to thesis goals
This section contributes to goals G3, G4 and G5. We have generated curves
Curve224 and Curve272 that satisfy the SafeCurves requirements. We used these
curves to construct EC cryptosystems, thus demonstrating the potential of our
curves in Signal protocol.
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9 Appendix 1: Order of the curves
9.1 Order of NIST P-256 using Schoof’s algorithm
NIST P-256 are of the equation: y2 = x3 − 3x+ b mod q
wine schoo f . exe −f 2#256−2#224+2#192+2#96−1 −3
41058363725152142129326129780047268409114441015993725554
835256314039467401291
P mod 8 = 7
P i s 256 b i t s long
Counting the number o f po in t s (NP) on the curve




18 primes used ( p lus l a r g e s t prime powers ) , l a r g e s t i s 61
NP mod 2 = 1
NP mod 3 = 1
NP mod 5 = 4
NP mod 7 = 3
NP mod 11 = 7
NP mod 13 = 5
NP mod 17 = 13
NP mod 19 = 10
NP mod 23 = 10
NP mod 25 = 19
NP mod 27 = 7
NP mod 29 = 23
NP mod 31 = 9
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NP mod 32 = 17
NP mod 37 = 35
NP mod 41 = 15
NP mod 43 = 34
NP mod 47 = 2
NP mod 49 = 38
NP mod 53 = 41
NP mod 59 = 34
NP mod 61 = 30
Re leas ing 5 Tame and 5 Wild Kangaroos
NP = 11579208921035624876269744694940757352999695522413
5760342422259061068512044369
NP i s Prime !
The cofactor for this curve is h = 1. Hence, the order of the curve is
NP = 1157920892103562487626974469494075735299969552241357603424222
59061068512044369
9.2 Sec256k1 - Bitcoin curve
wine schoo f . exe −f 2#256−2#32−2#9−2#8−2#7−2#6−2#4−1 0 7
P mod 8 = 7
P i s 256 b i t s long
Counting the number o f po in t s (NP) on the curve
yˆ2= xˆ3 + 7 mod 11579208923731619542357098500868790785
3269984665640564039457584007908834671663
Warning : j−i n v a r i a n t i s 0
18 primes used ( p lus l a r g e s t prime powers ) , l a r g e s t i s 61
NP mod 2 = 1
NP mod 3 = 1
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NP mod 5 = 2
NP mod 7 = 3
NP mod 11 = 3
NP mod 13 = 12
NP mod 17 = 7
NP mod 19 = 8
NP mod 23 = 8
NP mod 25 = 12
NP mod 27 = 25
NP mod 29 = 24
NP mod 31 = 9
NP mod 32 = 1
NP mod 37 = 17
NP mod 41 = 9
NP mod 43 = 29
NP mod 47 = 44
NP mod 49 = 38
NP mod 53 = 35
NP mod 59 = 9
NP mod 61 = 8
Re leas ing 5 Tame and 5 Wild Kangaroos
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NP = 1157920892373161954235709850086879078528375642790749
04382605163141518161494337
NP i s Prime !
The cofactor for this curve is h = 1. Hence, the order of the curve is NP
80
9.3 Order of Curve25519 using Schoof’s algorithm
Weierstrass curve-specific parameters (for Wei25519):




P mod 8 = 5
P i s 255 b i t s long
Counting the number o f po in t s (NP) on the curve





18 primes used ( p lus l a r g e s t prime powers ) , l a r g e s t i s 61
NP mod 2 = 0 ∗∗∗
NP mod 3 = 2
NP mod 5 = 2
NP mod 7 = 6
NP mod 11 = 8
NP mod 13 = 3
NP mod 17 = 13
NP mod 19 = 1
NP mod 23 = 17
NP mod 25 = 12
NP mod 27 = 5
NP mod 29 = 28
NP mod 31 = 30
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NP mod 32 = 8
NP mod 37 = 18
NP mod 41 = 18
NP mod 43 = 41
NP mod 47 = 21
NP mod 49 = 48
NP mod 53 = 24
NP mod 59 = 11
NP mod 61 = 7
Re leas ing 5 Tame and 5 Wild Kangaroos
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NP = 5789604461865809771178549250434395392685693087503926
0848015607506283634007912
The order of the curve as per the RFC is
2252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 7.2370056e+ 75
We can see that order of the curve multiplied by the 8 is equal to the





9.4 Order of Curve25519 using SageMath
sage : ec = E l l i p t i c C u r v e (GF(2∗∗255−19) , [ 0 , 4 8 6 6 6 2 , 0 , 1 , 0 ] )
sage : ec
E l l i p t i c Curve de f ined by yˆ2 = xˆ3 + 486662∗xˆ2 + x
over f i n i t e f i e l d o f s i z e 5789604461865809771178549250434
3953926634992332820282019728792003956564819949
sage : ec . order ( )
578960446186580977117854925043439539268569308750392608480
15607506283634007912
9.5 Order of Curve448 using SageMath
sage : ec = E l l i p t i c C u r v e (GF(2∗∗448 − 2∗∗224 − 1) ,
[ 0 , 1 5 6 3 2 6 , 0 , 1 , 0 ] )
sage : ec
E l l i p t i c Curve de f ined by yˆ2 = xˆ3 + 156326∗xˆ2 + x
over f i n i t e f i e l d o f s i z e 7268387242956068905493238078880
045343536413606873180602814901991806123281667307726863963
83698676545930088884461843637361053498018365439





9.6 Order of Curve M-511 using SageMath
sage : ec = E l l i p t i c C u r v e (GF(2∗∗511 − 187) ,
[ 0 , 5 3 0 4 3 8 , 0 , 1 , 0 ] )
sage : ec
E l l i p t i c Curve de f ined by $yˆ2 = xˆ3 + 530438∗xˆ2 + x$








9.7 Time analysis of Schoof’s algorithm
We calculate the time required for Schoof’s algorithm to count the points on
the curve. It is essential to understand long the algorithm takes to run given
specific curves.
9.7.1 Curve 25519
Counting the number of points (NP) on the curve:










Time required by the algorithm to compute the points is : 387.4464828968048
seconds.
9.7.2 NIST P-256
Counting the number of points (NP) on the curve









Time required by the algorithm to compute the points is : 508.2849681377411
seconds.
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9.7.3 Sec256k1 - Bitcoin curve
Counting the number of points (NP) on the curve
y2 = x3 + 7 mod 1157920892373161954235709850086879078532699846656
40564039457584007908834671663
NP = 115792089237316195423570985008687907852837564279074904382605
163141518161494337 NP is Prime!
Time required by the algorithm to compute the points is : 521.7670800685883
seconds.
9.7.4 Weierstrass Curves
Weierstrass curves that are generated over prime fields P-192, P-224, P-256,
P-384, and P-521 which have equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b.
P-192 Only for legacy use.
P-224


























































Montgomery curves have equation By2 = x3 + Ax2 + x
Curve25519















9.7.6 Twisted Edwards Curves
Twisted Edwards curves have equation ax2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
Edwards25519
























Koblitz curve has equation y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
Curve K-163 Only for legacy use.
Curve K-233






























Curve B-163 Only for legacy use.
Curve B-233



























10 Appendix 2: Code
All the code used in this thesis can be found here: https://github.com/
Tanay-D/Masters-Thesis
10.1 Montgomery curves
We have written the code for Montgomery curve point arithmetic and mont-
gomery ladder in C++ using GMP library. To run the code, we have to




2 * @brief addition of two points on a montgomery curve
3 * @param R
4 * @param P
5 * @param Q
6 * @return void
7 *
8 * Computes R = P+Q
9 * GMP Implementation of Montgomery curve point addition
formula.↪→
10 */












20 //R = P+Q
21 //assuming all the conditions are satisfied
22
23 //If P = Q









33 mpz_class f = E.p;
34 mpz_class one = 1;
35 mpz_class xtop,ytop,xtemp,ytemp,lambda;
36 mpz_class neg = -P.Y;
37
38
39 if(Q.X == 0 && Q.Y == 1){





44 else if(P.X == 0 && P.Y == 1){




49 ////////////// Step 1 ///////////////////
50 //computing lambda = = (x2 - x1)/(y2 - y1)
51 // (yQ - yP )/(xQ - xP )











61 //multiply the top with inverse and store it in lambda
62 lambda = xtemp*ytemp;
63 mpz_mod(lambda.get_mpz_t(),lambda.get_mpz_t(),f.get_mpz_t());
64
65 // add debug on settings
66 //std::cout << "lambda : " << lambda.get_str() <<
std::endl;↪→
67
68 ////////////// Step 2 ///////////////////
69 //x3 = B ^2 - A - x1 - x2
70 R.X = E.B *lambda * lambda - E.A - P.X - Q.X;
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71 mpz_mod(R.X.get_mpz_t(),R.X.get_mpz_t(),f.get_mpz_t());
72 //std::cout << "x3 : " << R.X.get_str() << std::endl;
73
74
75 ////////////// Step 3 ///////////////////
76 //y3 = (xP - x3) - yP







2 * @brief point multiplication using montgomery ladder method
3 * @param R
4 * @param P
5 * @param x
6 * @param M
7 * @return void
8 *
9 * Computes R = x[P]
10 * GMP Implementation of Montgomery ladder.
11 */
12 void MontCurve::Mladder(Point& R, const Point& P,const












23 for (i = 0; i < value_str.length(); i++) {
24 arr[i] = value_str[i] - '0';
25 }
26
27 for (i = 0 ; i <= value_str.length()-1 ; i++){
28





34 R1 = temp1;







42 R0 = temp0;











2 * @brief point multiplication using montgomery ladder method
3 * @param R
4 * @param P
5 * @param E
6 * @return void
7 *
8 * Computes R = x[P]
9 * GMP Implementation of Montgomery point doubling.
10 */
11
12 void MontCurve::ecdouble(Point& R,const Point& P,MontCurve E){
13
14 mpz_class f = E.p;







21 if(P.X == 0 && P.Y == 1){






28 ////////////// Step 1 ///////////////////
29 //computing lambda = = (3 x1^2 + 2Ax1 + 1)/2By1
30








37 //multiply the top with inverse and store it in lambda
38 lambda = xtemp*ytemp;
39 mpz_mod(lambda.get_mpz_t(),lambda.get_mpz_t(),f.get_mpz_t());
40
41 ////////////// Step 2 ///////////////////
42 //computing x3 + 2x1 = B 2 - A
43





48 ////////////// Step 3 ///////////////////
49 // computing y3 = y3 + y1 = (x1 - x3)
50





10.2 Twisted Edwards curves
We have written the code for twisted edwards curve point arithmetic in C++
using GMP library. To run the code, we have to make a class object for
edwards curve and then invoke the necessary class methods.
Twisted edwards curve point addition
1 /**
2 * @brief add
3 * @param R
4 * @param P
5 * @param Q
6 * @param d
7 * @param eda
8 * @return void
9 *
10 * Computes R = P+Q





14 void ECurve::add(Point& R,const Point& P,const Point& Q,ECurve
E){↪→
15
16 mpz_class f = E.p;
17 mpz_class one = 1;
18 mpz_class d_ = E.d;




23 //(x1+y1) + (x2+y1)
24 xtop = (P.X * Q.Y) + (Q.X * P.Y);
25 mpz_mod(xtop.get_mpz_t(),xtop.get_mpz_t(),f.get_mpz_t());
26
27 //1 + d*x1*x2*y1*y2





32 //multiply the top with inverse and store it in xtop














45 //multiply the top with inverse and store it in xtop








Twisted edwards curve point doubling
1 /**
2 * @brief add
3 * @param R
4 * @param P
5 * @param E
6 * @return void
7 *
8 * Computes R = 2*P




11 void ECurve::ecdouble(Point& R,const Point& P,ECurve E){
12 //R = P+P
13 ECurve::add(R,P,P,E);
14 }
Twisted edwards curve scalar multiplication
1 /**
2 * @brief add
3 * @param R
4 * @param P
5 * @param x
6 * @param E
7 * @return void
8 *
9 * Computes R = x*P





14 //core sclar multiplication
15 Point& ECurve::scalarmult(Point &R, const Point &P, mpz_class
x, ECurve &E){↪→
16
17 if(x == 0){

















34 void ECurve::scalar_mult(Point& R, const Point& P,mpz_class x,
ECurve& E){↪→
35 R = ECurve::scalarmult(R,P,x,E);
36
37 }
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